This study provides the first systematic analysis of the composition of charter school governing boards. We assemble a dataset of charter school boards in Massachusetts from 2001 to 2013 and investigate the consequences of donor and founder representation on governing boards. We find that the presence of donors on the charter school boards is positively related to financial performance and attribute this result to the donors' strong monitoring incentives because of their financial stakes in the school. We also show that financial outcomes are not generated at the expense of academic outcomes, as the presence of donors on the boards is also associated with higher student achievement. Founder representation on charter school boards, on the other hand, is associated with lower financial performance but higher academic achievement. 
INTRODUCTION
Charter schools are publicly funded yet privately managed schools that operate in threeto five-year incremental contracts and are subject to renewal under a performance contract primarily based on fiscal solvency and student achievement.
1 A board of directors governs each charter school. The board is accountable for the financial well-being of a charter school by approving capital assets, an operating budget, and closely monitoring the school's fiscal solvency during the length of the charter. Another key role of the board is to ensure that the charter school achieves year-to-year improvement in academic performance. If these two performance objectives are not fulfilled, the schools may have their contracts revoked at the end of the charter period. As charter schools face higher standards for accountability, performance, and competition for limited resources, greater attention has been given to the monitoring and oversight functions of charter school governing boards.
In this study, we explore the relationship between board composition and financial and academic outcomes of charter schools using a new, hand-collected dataset of individual director and board characteristics for eighty-nine charter schools that were operational in Massachusetts between 2001 and 2013. 2 To our knowledge, we perform the first large-scale analysis of the composition of charter school governing boards. We study financial performance because charter school revocation/nonrenewal decisions-a rate of approximately 14 percent since 1992 (CER 2009)-are most often due to financial mismanagement and governance problems, not educational issues (DeJarnatt 2012) . We also analyze the nonfinancial aspect of school performance, namely, student achievement, because charter authorizers consider both financial viability and academic performance as criteria for approval in the chartering process.
Our primary emphasis in this paper is on board members with direct ties to corporate and nonprofit sponsors/contributors by serving as staff members, executives, or on boards of directors.
3 To give one example, a director of KIPP Academy Lynn is an employee of Bain Capital, a leading global private investment firm based in Boston. His core areas of expertise are stated as corporate finance, private equity, and business strategy. Bain Capital at the same time provides funding to KIPP Academy Lynn. This board member is classified in our dataset as a director who represents a donor (henceforth donor-director).
As the example illustrates, employers of the donor-directors have resources invested in the charter school. As such, we expect these directors to possess strong incentives to monitor the charter school management and make sure that the resources are being utilized as promised, thereby ensuring their good reputation with their employers. In addition, the analyses of nonprofit boards by Fama and Jensen (1983) and Hansmann (1980) suggest that donors who serve on the boards in a monitoring capacity help to assure other stakeholders that the services provided by the organization are of reasonable quality and that organizational resources are used in the way in which they are intended. Also, representation of donors on the charter school governing boards is 1. We study the Massachusetts (MA) charter schools, therefore we will follow the characterization of MA charter schools in this study. For more details about MA charter schools, please refer to www.doe.mass.edu/charter. 2. Charter schools can only be understood in terms of the legal and regulatory framework in which they operate (Lacireno-Pacquet 2006) . Our description of incentives and regulations is state-specific. 3. We use the words "trustee," "director," and "board member" interchangeably.
expected to minimize contracting costs as they act as a credible signal to other donors that the academic program supplied by the charter school is of high quality and financial resources are not being squandered by school administrators.
Our main hypothesis is that donor representation on boards is associated with higher financial performance of charter schools through the monitoring function they fulfill on the governing boards. Our findings support this hypothesis: Schools with donor-directors have significantly higher financial surpluses (i.e., Revenues minus Costs scaled by Total Assets), meet and exceed their projected budgetary goals, rely less on debt, manage their cash more efficiently, raise more funds, and have higher enrollment growth. We also find that these directors are associated with higher student achievement. Hence, superior financial performance is not accomplished at the expense of educational outcomes.
One may argue that donor-directors may be more likely to have financial expertise and therefore could provide valuable advice to charter school management on how to utilize financial resources in the least costly and most efficient manner. If this is the case, our results might reflect the financial expertise of the board rather than the financial stakes of the directors that lead to enhanced monitoring intensity. To disentangle the expertise and monitoring hypotheses, we compare donor-directors to board members who are solely financial experts. 4 For example, a board member of River Valley Charter School is an undersecretary of administration and finance for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. His core areas of expertise are stated as corporate governance, budgeting, accounting, and financial modeling. We argue that financial experts would have fewer incentives to monitor the use of financial resources because they are not active donors of the schools. Therefore, differences between donors and financial experts on school boards can be attributed to the monitoring incentives.
We find that the financial performance of charter schools is not significantly different between schools with and without financial experts on their boards. In addition, enrollment growth is lower when a financial expert is present. Because financial experts do not have a similar positive impact on financial outcomes as their donor-director counterparts, we conclude that donor representation adds to the monitoring capacity of the board.
An alternative explanation for the positive relationship between donor representation on boards and charter school financial performance might be a "rebound effect." If donors join boards that are already struggling financially, then the positive correlation with current performance could be a rebound effect rather than a monitoring effect. We observe that forty-one of the schools added a donor to their boards at the same time as the establishment of the schools. Because these 41 schools had donors on their boards from the start, the alternative explanation (rebound effect) does not apply to them. We repeat our analyses using only these schools and still find a positive relationship between donors and performance. Therefore, we conclude that donors have a positive impact on financial performance beyond a rebound effect.
We also study the impact of the founders serving on charter school boards. In general, the founder-directors are well-known education leaders and social entrepreneurs in education (Finn, Manno, and Vanourek 2000) and possess strong financial and personal stakes in the charter schools. In our analysis of financial outcomes, we find a significant negative relationship between founder presence on charter school boards and financial performance, private grants, and enrollment growth. In addition, these schools rely on borrowed funds more heavily to finance their operations. Several theories support the negative effect of founder-directors on performance. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) argue that founder-directors have the potential to configure boards and management that are less inclined to threaten their discretion, hence lowering the monitoring effectiveness of the board. It has also been contended that founders may compromise the best interests of the organization to serve their own interests, such as preserving their own positions and lowering their likelihood of departure (Anderson, Duru, and Reeb 2009) .
On the positive side, we find a significant and positive impact of founders on academic achievement, reflecting the founders' expertise in the education sector (Yancey 2000) . The positive impact of founders on academic achievement provides general support for the stewardship theory, which states that founders are intrinsically motivated to work for organizations to accomplish the mission and goals with which they have been entrusted.
The findings of this study make several contributions to the literature on the governance of charter schools, a largely unexplored area. Evidence from existing qualitative research on charter school governing boards consists predominantly of anecdotal reports and in-depth case studies (Karanxha 2013) . Other studies on charter school governance are oriented toward practitioners and underpin normative board roles and responsibilities developed for nonprofit boards (Yancey 2000) . To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first study that investigates the composition of charter school boards using hand-collected data on director characteristics, and empirically analyze the relationship between charter school financial performance and board composition.
Our paper also contributes to the broader literature on donor governance of nonprofit organizations (e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983) . Studying a panel dataset of prominent U.S. art museums from 1999 to 2013, Yermack (2015) finds that donor governance has greatly increased in recent years and has had a real and significant impact on museums' balance sheets and cost structures. Yermack further notes that donors react to weak governance oversight by adding restrictions to gifts. Callen, Klein, and Tinkelman (2003) find that the presence of major donors on a nonprofit board is associated with effective board monitoring. Indeed, the dual roles of donors in financing and monitoring has been supported by numerous other empirical studies (e.g., Eldenburg et al. 2004; Harris, Petrovits, and Yetman 2015) .
DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS Sample Formation
To explore the relationship between the presence of donors, financial experts, and founders on governing boards and the financial and academic outcomes of charter schools, we assembled a dataset of individual director and board characteristics for 89 charter schools that were operational in Massachusetts between 2001 and 2013. Our final dataset consists of 780 observations at the school-year level on board of directors, financial variables, school characteristics, and academic achievement variables. We provide the descriptions of all variables and the data sources in table 1.
Massachusetts provides a proper setup to study the relationship between board composition and charter school performance, for several reasons. First, from their inception in 1994, charter schools in Massachusetts have been required to file annual reports as well as audited and unaudited financial statements, which we use to collect data on financial performance. Second, unlike other states, Massachusetts law does not mandate that charter school boards follow specific requirements on who can and cannot serve on their board of trustees (MADOE 2010) . Third, the law explicitly allows charter school boards to be involved in cross-sectoral alliances to enhance their financial capacity and improve educational services.
Data on Board Composition
We hand-collected biographical information and organizational affiliation of all charter school board members from several sources, such as annual reports and charter applications submitted to the Massachusetts Department of Education, Office of Charter Schools. The annual reports provide the names, titles/affiliations, and the biographies of members of charter school boards. The director database cross-references employment history, background, and professional qualifications available over the school Web sites, professional networking Web sites, and search engines (e.g., Zoominfo.com, LinkedIn) that specialize in collecting and indexing biographical and employment data from publicly available documents.
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Donors
Building on prior description and analysis of the range of private givers to public education (Zimmer, Krop, and Brewer 2003; Hansen 2008) , we define donor-directors as board members with direct ties to locally based voluntary contributors, independent foundations, and donors or sponsors who serve as staff members, executives, or on a board of directors. In addition, to review and cross-reference our dataset of locally based contributors, foundations, and corporate sponsors, we sent charter school administrators a one-question survey on external support. The indicator variable "Donor on Board" takes the value one if a charter school has at least one donor-director as defined above, and zero otherwise.
Financial Experts
Our definition of financial expert follows Güner, Malmendier, and Tate (2008) . A director is identified as a financial expert if he/she works at a financial institution or has a finance-related role within a nonfinancial institution (i.e., financial management 5. Gulosino collected and coded the data. To gain the fullest possible understanding of the influence of one board member on charter school governance and school outcomes, we collected multiple sources of evidence to enhance the trustworthiness and credibility of findings. Specifically, the study augmented biographical data and contributions made by organizations from annual charter school reports with additional information from company/organization Web sites, local gazettes, school Web sites, online newspapers, and a one-question survey to charter school principals and/or financial officers that asks for a list of the names of the schools' financial contributors.Şişli Ciamarra cross-checked and independently reviewed the data. Composite Performance Index (CPI) A measure of the extent to which students are progressing toward proficiency in English language arts (ELA) and mathematics, respectively. The CPI is a 100-point index that combines the scores of students who take standard Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) tests (the Proficiency Index) with the scores of those who take the MCAS-Alternate Assessment (MCAS-Alt) (the MCAS-Alt Index).
MA Charter School Accountability Reports (MCAS), retrieved from http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/statereport/mcas.aspx
Percentage of proficient scores Percentage of students who scored advanced or proficient in English language arts (ELA) and mathematics.
MA Charter School Accountability Reports (MCAS)
Score index The index score is equal to 4 times the percent of students in the advanced category plus 3 times the percent of all students in the proficient category plus 2 times the percent of students in the needs improvement category plus 1 times the percent of students in the warning category. Total points are divided by the number of students to calculate school averages.
MA Charter School Accountability Reports (MCAS) 
MA Charter School Profiles
Percentage of Asian students The percentage of charter school students who are Asian/Pacific Islander.
Percentage of Hispanic students The percentage of charter school students who are Hispanic.
Percentage of Native American students The percentage of charter school students who are American Indian/Alaska Native.
Percentage of nonnative English speakers The percentage of charter school students whose first language is a language other than English.
Percentage of male students The percentage of charter school students who are male.
Percentage with limited English proficiency The percentage of charter school students whose first language is a language other than English and who are unable to perform ordinary classroom work in English.
Percentage of special education students The percentage of charter school students with an Individualized Education Program.
Percentage of licensed teachers The percentage of teachers licensed in teaching assignment.
Percentage of qualified teachers The percentage of core academic classes taught by teachers who are highly qualified.
Student-teacher ratio The ratio of full-time-equivalent students to full-time-equivalent teachers.
Elementary school A dummy variable indicating whether the charter school is elementary school or not.
Middle school A dummy variable indicating whether the charter school is middle school or not.
High school A dummy variable indicating whether the charter school is high school or not.
Local charter management organization (CMO) Nonprofit entities that operate networks of charter schools in a single state (i.e., Massachusetts). specialist, chief financial officer, accountant, treasurer, vice president of finance), or in an academic institution (e.g., professor in finance, accounting, economics or business), or is a professional investor (e.g., hedge fund, private equity). In addition, board members holding degrees in the areas of accounting, finance, investment, banking, or a related field are considered financial experts. The indicator variable "Financial Expert on Board" takes the value one if a charter school has at least one financial expert serving on its board of directors, and zero otherwise.
Founders
Founder-directors are members of charter boards of directors responsible for the establishment of the school on which they serve as a board member. To code founderdirectors, we extracted records of all founders from charter school applications and renewal requests. The indicator variable "Founder on Board" takes the value one if a charter school has at least one of its own founders serving on its board of directors, and zero otherwise.
Descriptive Statistics for Charter School Boards
During our sample period (table 2), the average charter school board consists of 11.55 members; 65.51 percent of the schools have at least one donor-director serving on their boards (although the percentage has been decreasing over the years in our sample period); 71.67 percent have at least one financial expert serving on their boards; and, finally, 71.28 percent of the charter school boards have at least one founder-director.
In figure 1 we describe the evolution of charter school boards between 2001 and 2013. The average board size has remained unchanged from 2001 (at 11.73 members) to 2013 (at 11.10 members). We observe that donor representation on charter school boards is in a downward trend. In 2003, about 78 percent of the charter schools utilized the 
Data on Financial Outcomes
The financial data for years 2001 to 2013 are obtained from annual reports and audited financial statements that charter schools submit to the state's Department of Education. Each financial data-year contains a statement of revenues and expenditures, changes in net assets, cash flows, a balance sheet of the school's assets, liabilities, and fund balances or equities, and projections of income and expenses for the upcoming school year (MADOE 2015) . Our study utilizes six proxy measures of financial outcomes: (1) the difference between revenues and expenditures (i.e., financial surplus) scaled by total assets; (2) the difference between the financial surplus and the budgeted surplus scaled by total assets; (3) the debt-to-asset ratio; (4) the change in net assets scaled by total revenues; (5) the share of private grants in total funds; and (6) total funds.
The first measure, (Revenues-Expenditures)/Total Assets, serves as a proxy to determine whether a school operates at a financial surplus (more revenues than expenses) or at a financial deficit (more expenses than revenues). Charter schools cannot operate on a deficit for a sustained period of time without risk of closure.
The second measure, (Financial Surplus-Budgeted Surplus)/Total Assets, captures the extent to which a charter school exceeded or fell short of its financial target. Budgeted surplus is defined as the projected total revenues minus the projected total expenses, which are obtained from individual school budget projection reports. We construct this variable because charter schools are similar to nonprofit organizations in the sense that their objective is to achieve financial stability, rather than to maximize profits (i.e., Revenues-Expenditures). Accordingly, our second financial performance measure serves as a proxy to assess the extent to which each charter school's governing board exceeded or fell short of its financial goals. This measure incorporates two prime financial responsibilities of the charter school board, namely, to come up with a realizable school budget plan (budgeted surplus) and to ensure that the school does not fall short of projections upon which the budget is based (actual financial surplus).
The third measure, debt-to-asset ratio, captures the difference between liabilities and assets, indicating the extent to which a charter school relies on borrowed funds to finance its operations. A higher debt-to-asset ratio indicates that the school is "highly leveraged" (tendency to utilize debt financing, also known as debt load) and thus in greater financial risk if creditors demand repayment of debt. Sound financial management requires the charter school board understand when to utilize debt financing and manage the debt once incurred.
The fourth measure, (Change in Net Assets/Total Revenues), serves as a proxy to determine a school's cash management efficiency. Finally, the last two measures attempt to capture the ability of a charter school to raise funding and attract private support outside of federal, state, and district funds. In addition to these financial outcomes, we also study enrollment growth.
Data on School Characteristics
Data on school characteristics are compiled using the Massachusetts Department of Education Report Cards for 2001 to 2013. We utilize a number of key indicators as control variables in our analyses of the relationship between board composition and school performance: percentage of students who are Hispanic, African American, Asian, and Native American; percentage of low-income students; percentage of native English speakers; percentage of students with limited English proficiency (LEP); percentage of students who receive special education services; male-female composition of enrolled students; student-teacher ratio; percentage of licensed teachers; and percentage of qualified teachers. Table 3 reports the school-level descriptive statistics.
Data on Academic Achievement
We use school-level average achievement scores as a proxy for academic performance. Prior research has guided the selection of mathematics and English Language Arts test scores in this study (e.g., Carnoy and Loeb 2002) . Beginning in 1998, the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) was administered annually to eligible students enrolled in grades 3 through 8 and in high school, including students with disabilities and LEP students. Results of the MCAS Mathematics and English Language Arts assessment are reported for individual schools by four performance levels: advanced, proficient, needs improvement, and warning.
We proxy academic performance with three measures calculated using the English Language Arts and Math scores: (1) composite performance index, a state-generated measure of the extent to which students are progressing toward proficiency; (2) percentage of students who scored Proficient or Advanced; and (3) an academic performance index based on the distribution of student scores in the various performance categories. Specifically, the index score is equal to four times the percent of students in the advanced category plus three times the percent of all students in the proficient category plus two times the percent of students in the needs improvement category plus one times the percent of students in the warning category. Total points divided by the number of students calculates school averages. Although the average achievement of students in a school does not account for individual variation in achievement between students, it is useful for examining the relations between the general level of achievement in a school and characteristics of the school (Hill, Angel, and Christensen 2006) . Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the academic performance indicators.
EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
To analyze the relationship between the composition of board of directors and charter school performance, we estimate the following equation:
where Y i,t measures the financial or the academic outcomes of the charter school i in year t, D i,t is a dummy variable indicating the presence of a donor, a financial expert, or a founder on the charter school board, and X i,t is the set of control variables. Recent literature on the composition of corporate boards stresses the importance of correcting for biases that result from any nonrandom assignment of directors to board positions (see Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach 2010) . 6 In addition, charter school research is also confounded by selection bias, when the students who self-select into charter schools may be different from other students for unobservable reasons (i.e., parental preference; higher parental education level, motivation, and involvement), making it difficult to estimate the academic performance levels of these schools (Gleason et al. 2014) .
Our study potentially suffers from similar self-selection problems. Therefore, to alleviate the bias that results from any nonrandom assignment of donors, financial experts, and founders to charter school board positions, we build a treatment effects model that is developed specifically to analyze the dummy endogenous variables (Heckman 1978; Angrist 2004) . Under this approach the probability of receiving a treatment (i.e., assigning a donor, a financial expert, or a founder to the board) is modeled together with the structural outcome equation. The full model can be summarized as:
with
D i,t is an endogenous dummy variable indicating whether a charter school includes a donor-director, a financial expert, or a founder-director on the board. A set of explanatory variables Z i,t determines this binary outcome. The individual error terms, e i,t and u i,t , are assumed to have a bivariate normal distribution.
6. The instrumental variables estimation is the most widely used estimation technique for empirical studies affected by the endogeneity problem. However, there is a further issue in the validity of instrumental variables estimation when one of the endogenous regressors is a dummy variable.Şişli Ciamarra (2012) and Hilscher andŞişli Ciamarra (2013) also use the average treatment effects methodology to analyze the impact of the presence of banker-directors on corporate boards. Please see Greene (2003, pp. 787-88) , for details and additional references.
The explanatory variables we include in the selection equation (equation 2b) are school enrollment, school age, indicator variables for schools managed by local and national charter management organizations (CMOs), percentage of low income students, and board size. School enrollment measures the size of the school. School age is included to capture the life cycle of charter schools. To secure the financial resources and financial advice demanded by growth, charter schools must seek out directors with financial expertise, connections, and resources. In addition, there is substantial growth in the number of CMO networks operating charter schools within a network of affiliated schools at the national and local levels. The national CMO networks in the dataset are Sabis International, Uncommon Schools, and KIPP Academy. Statewide, they operate a combined total of six charter schools. In addition, seven local CMO networks operate a total of sixteen charter schools across the state. In all our analyses, we acknowledge that the governance structures, as well as financial and academic policies of charter schools that are run by the CMOs (especially national CMOs), may differ from those of independent charter schools. We therefore control for the CMO status of the schools in our regressions.
In theory, exclusion restrictions are not necessary in average treatment effects estimation because the model is identified by nonlinearity (Heckman and Navarro-Lozano 2004) . However, in practice, the identification issue is less clearcut (Li and Prabhala 2007) . To avoid the issue of exclusion restrictions, we use the size (measured as the number of employees) of the finance and nonprofit sectors in the counties where charter schools are located as an instrumental variable.
Our instrumentation strategy is based on the assumption that the probability of having a donor on the board is positively correlated with the pool of financial establishments and nonprofit establishments that are located in proximity to charter schools, as these directors are mainly employed in these sectors. Although we expect the number of employees in the finance and nonprofit sectors to be correlated with donor-directors, we do not expect it to be correlated with school performance (except through variables already included in our regressions). Similarly, we use the size of the finance sector in a charter school's county as an instrument for a financial expert's presence on a charter school board, and the size of the nonprofit sector as an instrument for the presence of founders on the board. We provide more detailed definitions of these sectors in table 1.
In our performance regressions (equation 2a), we control for enrollment, school age, educational competition, CMO status, teacher characteristics, student-teacher ratio, board size, and percentage of low-income students. Based on prior studies, there is no agreed-upon specification for how to model the impact of charter school maturity on performance (Sass 2006) . We follow Loderer and Waelchli (2010) and use a quadratic specification for school age. One could argue that charter schools are more effective or efficient when competition is likely to be more intense. Therefore, in our regressions, we control for educational competition. We followed Sass (2006) to form our competition variable-the enrollment share of a charter school within a geographic concentration. Other studies that use the market share of charter schools as a measure of competition include Hoxby (2003) , Booker et al. (2008), and Ni (2009) . Following Sass (2006) , we utilized the Geographic Information System to determine the competitors of a charter school within five miles of its radius. Then we obtained the enrollment figures for each competitor. Our competition measure is the total enrollment at a charter school divided by the total enrollment in public, charter, and private schools that offer the same grade levels as the charter school.
We estimate equation 2 with maximum likelihood. The test results for the significance of the correlation between the error terms of the structural and treatment equations are presented throughout the study. These results form the basis of our empirical test for the presence of self-selection. A correlation coefficient that is significantly different from zero validates the need for the correction for self-selection. When self-selection is present, the average treatment effects (ATE) is the appropriate empirical model to use as opposed to the ordinary least squares (OLS).
7 When self-selection is not present, the ATE estimates converge to the OLS estimates.
RESULTS
Donors on Board and Financial Performance
In table 4, panel A, we stratify our sample on charter schools according to the presence or absence of a donor-director on their boards and test their differences in terms of financial performance. The differences in financial outcomes of schools with and without donor representation on their boards are not statistically significant, except for Financial Surplus/Total Assets and Private Grants/Total Funds. Per the univariate test results, Financial Surplus Ratio is lower (0.04 versus 0.08), and the share of private grants in total funds is higher (5.95 percent versus 3.37 percent) for schools with donordirectors. Table 5 presents the ATE estimation results for equation 2a, where the dependent variables measure the financial performance and stability of charter schools. The tests for independent equations (i.e., lack of self-selection) are rejected for each specification at the 1 percent significance level. The correlation coefficients between the two error terms (rho) are negative and significant (e.g., for the financial surplus equations), implying that there is a negative correlation between a school's choice to have a donordirector on its board and its financial performance.
8 This indicates that the unobservable characteristics that prompt schools to have a donor-director also cause them to have a lower financial performance. For example, charter schools may be more inclined to invite donors to join their boards if they project that the school will not be doing well financially.
The main variable of interest in these regressions is the coefficient on the Donor on Board indicator variable. In column 1, the financial performance is measured with Financial Surplus/Total Assets, where Actual Surplus is calculated as the revenues in excess of the expenditures in a given year. The coefficient on the donor-director is positive (0.375), and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The effect of donor-directors is also practically significant: their presence is associated with a 37.5 percentage point increase in the surplus ratio. In column 2, the dependent variable is (Financial Surplus-Budgeted Surplus)/Total Assets, which quantifies the extent to which a charter school has met its budgetary goals. The coefficient is positive (0.304) and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This coefficient indicates that the presence of donors on the board is associated with a 30.4 percentage point increase in attaining the projected financial surplus of a charter school.
In column 3, we analyze the debt-to-asset ratio and find that charter schools with donors on their boards rely significantly less on borrowed funds. In column 4, the dependent variable is Change in Net Assets/Total Revenues, which is a metric that charter schools utilize to measure the efficiency of their cash management. Using this metric, we uncover a positive and significant relationship between donor representation on boards and cash management efficiency. The coefficient on the Donor on Board indicator variable is 0.176 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Given the mean value of this financial indicator (0.04), the estimated increase is practically significant as well.
In columns 5 and 6, we investigate the funding of charter schools. We find that schools with donor-directors have significantly higher total funds (coefficient = 0.255), but the relative share of private grants in total funds is lower at these schools (coefficient = −10.723). Previously reported prior studies of private giving to public schools find that many sources of such funding do not make commitments to provide the resources over an extended period, hence creating year-to-year fluctuations in private revenues (Nelson and Gazley 2014) . Because private funds are not stable revenue sources that charter schools can utilize to cover costs anticipated in the yearly operating budget, a steady inflow of revenues coming from public sources is seen as helping charter schools reach financial stability and viability.
Finally, in column 7, we investigate enrollment growth. The coefficient on the indicator variable for donor presence is 19.4 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, implying that on average these directors are associated with a yearly 19.4 percent increase in the number of students a charter school serves.
Among the 511 school-year observations with donor representation on boards, 370 also have a financial expert present on the board and in 384 cases there is also a founder on the board. All three types of directors are present in 281 school-year observations in our sample. We perform a robustness check by controlling directly for financial expert and founder presence and find that doing so does not alter our relevant finding, namely, that donors are associated with better financial outcomes. Our analysis follows the approach of an empirical work by Hilscher andŞişli Ciamarra (2013) in corporate governance, which deals with the evaluation of the effects of multiple types of bankers on corporate boards.
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Financial Experts on Boards and Financial Performance
Our main hypothesis in this study is that representation of donors on the board leads to higher financial performance and stability of a charter school owing to their effective monitoring of the charter school administration. Our findings so far support this hypothesis, namely, that representation of donors on the board is associated with better financial outcomes. However, one may argue that donor-directors are more likely to have financial expertise and therefore could provide valuable advice to charter school management on how to utilize financial resources in the least costly and most efficient manner. If this is the case, our results might reflect financial expertise of the board rather than financial stakes of the donor-directors leading to higher monitoring intensity.
To disentangle the expertise and monitoring hypotheses, we study the board members who are solely "financial experts." These directors possess financial skills and 9. However, we note that in cases where we control for multiple governance indicators, we need to treat their point estimates with caution. The reason for this is that there are many types of possible selection biases associated with all three types of board members but it is econometrically not straightforward to implement a multiple treatment effects model. expertise but do not provide financial resources to charter schools. This is the strategy followed by Kroszner and Strahan (2001) , Booth and Deli (1999) ,Şişli Ciamarra (2012), and Hilscher andŞişli Ciamarra (2013). We argue that financial experts would have fewer incentives to contribute to the board's monitoring function because they do not have any outstanding financial contributions to the charter school. Therefore, any difference between donor-directors and financial experts can be attributed to the enhanced monitoring incentives that donor-directors possess.
In table 4, panel B, we stratify our sample on charter schools according to the presence or absence of financial experts on their boards and test their differences in term of financial performance. The differences in financial outcomes of schools with and without donors on their boards are not statistically significant except for Private Grants/Total Funds. According to the univariate test results, the share of private grants in total funds is higher (5.43 percent versus 4.15 percent) for schools with financial experts serving on their boards.
We present the ATE estimation results in table 6. The results suggest that financial experts have no significant effect on financial performance. The coefficient on the financial expert indicator variable is insignificant for Financial Surplus/Total Assets and also for (Financial Surplus-Budgeted Surplus)/Total Assets (columns 1 and 2). The coefficient on Change in Net Assets/Total Revenues is positive (0.190) and statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Schools with financial experts on their boards do not exhibit significant differences in total funds and funding structure (columns 5 and 6). Finally, financial expertise on boards is associated with lower enrollment growth (column 7). 10 We conclude that a financial expert's presence on a charter school board is not sufficient to generate a positive impact on financial performance and stability. Hence, we infer that donor representation on charter school boards contribute to the school governance beyond simply giving advice on financial matters. We attribute this positive impact to the monitoring function they perform on the board. This finding is consistent with previous studies, which assert that donors/sponsors who serve on the nonprofit boards in a monitoring capacity are able to assist in the quest to maximize the efficient use of resources and create a high level of transparency and accountability in an organization's finances (Fama and Jensen 1983; Hansmann 1980) .
Rebound Effect versus Monitoring Effect
We have shown that the presence of donors among its directors has a positive impact on charter school financial performance. We argue that their positive impact may be due to two reasons: (1) financial expertise and/or (2) monitoring. By utilizing the differences between donors and financial experts (who are not donors), we conclude that the positive effect is not from financial expertise, but from monitoring. However, if donors join boards already in financial distress, then the positive relationship between donor presence and financial performance might be due to a rebound effect rather than a general "monitoring" effect. 10 . We have repeated the estimations excluding the charter schools with donor-directors. Our results remain unchanged. ) , Log(Board Size), National CMO and Local CMO Indicators, Percentage of Low-Income Students, and the instrumental variable Log(Employment in the Finance and Nonprofit Sectors). All regressions control for year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered at the charter school level. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** significant at the 0.05 level; * significant at the 0.10 level.
Of the eighty-nine charter schools in the dataset, sixty-eight had a donor present on their boards at one point in time. We observe that forty-one of the schools added a donor to their boards at the same time as the establishment of the schools. Because these forty-one schools had donors on their boards from the start, the alternative explanation (rebound effect) does not apply to them. Therefore, in table 7, we restrict the sample further and only include in our donor-director sample the forty-one schools that had donors since their inception. Our results remain unchanged-donor presence is associated with significantly higher performance across different performance measures. To investigate the rebound effect further, we also perform estimations, where we directly control for the lagged performance in our selection equations. Including past performance in the selection equation takes care of the concern that the donors might be solely invited to and retained on the boards of charter schools that need a turnaround. The effect of donor-directors on financial performance of charter schools remains positive after controlling for past performance in the selection equation.
To summarize, the positive relationship between donor presence and financial performance cannot be solely explained by a rebound effect.
Founders on Board and Financial Performance
As described earlier in the data section, another central group of board members with financial and/or personal stakes in the success of the charter schools are the founders. The impact of founder-directors on charter school performance is not obvious. Unlike donor-directors, the founder-directors are not independent board members and the literature so far is unclear on their actual role in board governance and firm/organizational performance. On the negative side, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) note that founder-directors have the potential to configure boards and management that are less inclined to threaten their discretion, and they may compromise the best interests of the organization to serve their own interests, such as preserving their own positions and lowering their likelihood of departure (Anderson, Duru, and Reeb 2009) . If there is a threshold point in the development of entrepreneurial organizations where information-processing/decision-making capabilities of founders are no longer sufficient to meet the organization's oversight needs, as Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, and Schulze (2004) and Willard, Krueger, and Feeser (1992) discuss, then we may expect a negative relationship between the presence of founders and performance.
Founders have been the research focus in a limited number of qualitative studies. Most notably, the negative effects of "founder's syndrome" or "founderitis" has been described by the literature on boards of directors (Linnell 2004) . Founder syndrome refers to the dynamic that develops when a founding leader's vision, high energy, and commitment that were critical to organizing and opening a new school later become counterproductive to the larger school interest while in operation. This "syndrome" is observable in other organizations, both nonprofit and for-profit alike.
On the positive side, a competing theoretical consideration on founders is the stewardship principle, which states that individual goals do not motivate founder-directors, but instead they behave as stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of the organization they founded. Stewardship theory views founders as stewards, who manage their organizations responsibly to improve their performance (Muth and Donaldson 1998) . Specific to the charter school setting, the presence of founder-directors represents an important governing mechanism that shapes charter school governance, given their commitment to the educational goals of the school. For example, Loveless and Jasin (1998) have pointed out that managing a charter school requires that founders leverage a wealth of educational and organizational resources necessary to successfully navigate the startup and operational phases of a charter school. Despite founders' important contributions to the genesis of charter schools, the extent to which founder's syndrome impacts the performance accountability (also known as resultsaccountability or outcomes-based accountability) of charter schools is largely unknown and we fill this gap in our research.
In table 4, panel C, we stratify our sample on charter schools according to the presence or absence of founders on their boards and test their differences in term of financial performance. According to the univariate test results, Financial Surplus Ratio is significantly lower (0.07 versus 0.01), and the debt ratio is significantly higher (0.45 versus 0.35) for schools with founder-directors.
In table 8 we present the ATE estimation results for the relationship between the presence of founders on boards and the financial outcomes of charter schools. Our findings suggest that founder-directors are associated with poorer financial performance. The presence of founder-directors on the board is associated with a 17.1 percentage point decrease in the financial surplus, a result that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level (column 1). The schools perform more poorly in terms of all of the remaining financial outcome measures as well. They are less able to meet their budgetary goals (column 2), depend more on debt to finance their operation (column 3), have less efficient cash management practices (column 4), are not able to raise funds as much as the rest of the charter schools (column 6), and achieve a lower enrollment growth rate (column 7). These results all together indicate that the presence of founder-directors on school boards is associated with poorer financial outcomes, and are consistent with descriptive studies of the relationship between founders and organizational survival (Wasserman 2008) and the founder's syndrome that we have described previously.
Board Composition and Academic Achievement
While the focus of this study is the impact of board composition on charter schools' financial performance, we also analyze the nonfinancial aspect of school performance, namely, academic achievement. The most efficient charter schools are the ones that use the fewest resources to produce a given level of achievement or raise achievement to higher levels with a given amount of resources (Levin and McEwan 2002) . For the same reason, as charter authorizers consider both financial viability and academic performance as criteria for approval in the chartering process, charter school boards also face dual objectives. However, these two objectives (financial viability and student achievement) may at times conflict. For example, schools may choose to cut back on educational services to students with special needs and alter input variables such as teacher-student ratios in response to continuing financial difficulties, but doing so may negatively impact student achievement.
In table 4 we present the univariate test statistics. Schools with and without donordirectors do not differ in terms of academic outcomes (panel A). The evidence for financial experts is mixed (panel B). Schools with founder-directors, on average, perform better in terms of academics (panel C).
In tables 9 through 11, we investigate the relationship between board composition and academic performance in a multivariate setting. Table 9 presents the ATE estimation results for donor-directors. Our aim here is to rule out the possibility that the positive impact of these directors on financial outcomes may be coming at the expense of academic achievement. The results convince us that it does not. We find that donor representation on boards is associated with better academic performance using the six academic performance measures we have described in the data section. For example, the coefficient on the Donor on Board indicator variable is positive (28.37) and statistically significant at the 1 percent level for the Math Proficient Percentage estimation (column 1), after controlling for school characteristics. Given the mean value of Math Proficient Percentage (50.48), this coefficient is practically significant as well. In addition to board composition, we also find that several school-level characteristics, such as percent licensed teachers and percent native English speakers, predict achievement. We find positive academic achievement results for older charter schools, high schools, and schools with greater percentages of qualified teachers and native English speakers. We find lower academic achievement results for larger charter school boards, schools with lower percentages of licensed teachers, and schools with greater percentages of lowincome, LEP, and special needs students. The estimated relationship between these school characteristics and student achievement is in line with the findings of prior studies on academic achievement (Sirin 2005) . In table 10 we present the results for financial experts. Controlling for school-level characteristics, the estimated coefficients on the Financial Expert on Board indicator variable are mixed.
In table 11 we present the results for the estimated relationship between founder presence on boards and academic outcomes. Our findings show a positive and statistically significant relationship after controlling for school-level characteristics for all 
CONCLUSION
We have studied the impact of three common types of charter school board members: donors, financial experts, and founders. The results of this study provide new insights in understanding the differential impact on both financial and academic outcomes from the different types of charter school boards of directors. We show that the representation of donors on charter school boards is positively related to financial performance and academic achievement. The results confirm the main hypothesis in this paper, namely, that the expertise of donor-directors, combined with their monitoring incentives, will result in higher financial performance for charter schools.
On the other hand, we find the presence of founders on charter school boards is negatively related to financial performance but is positively related to academic achievement. The continued presence of founders on the board may represent both a hindrance and an asset to organizational performance. This may be a good reality check for founders to realize that their strong personal attachment and financial stake in the charter schools are not enough for the continued growth and success of their schools.
Anecdotal evidence supports our findings (table 12) . Our dataset confirms the closure of eight schools over the thirteen-year period in Massachusetts. Nearly all schools (seven out of eight schools) were shut down because of financial problems. The presence of donors on the charter school boards accounted for 37 percent of the closures (three of eight). Given that 66 percent of the schools in the sample have donors on the board, it seems clear that charter school closures are less likely for those schools with donor representation on the board. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical research to systematically examine the influence of directors on charter school performance. The range of organizations providing financial and material resources to traditional public schools and to charter schools is diverse, and our understanding is fragmentary. Although private resources supporting public education are nothing new, there is recent interest in exploring whether nongovernment organizations, such as foundation donors, are responding to incentives to increase accountability for school performance (Hansen 2008) . In closing, the current study seeks to contribute to a slowly growing body of research on charter school governance, and offers the first empirical examination of the relationship between charter school board members and financial performance. Improving the financial performance of charter school boards has implications for greater accountability at the school site. Given expanded authority and fiscal resources, decision makers (charter school boards) close to the ground should be better able to handle internal control over financial performance. Our study suggests that the linkage between board makeup and board objectives cannot be overlooked, since the presence/absence of certain board members influences different performance outcomes.
